






8
No. 2.

THE
OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION
OF THE
MILITIA OF CANADA.



SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING
1899.

No. 2.

THE
OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION
OF THE MILITIA OF CANADA.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE
SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING 1899.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
List of Officers, Etc.	6
Summary of Minutes of Semi-Annual Meeting	7
Lecture on "The Evolution of the Canadian Army" by Capt. C. F. WINTER, the G.G. Foot Guards	10
Discussion	45

THE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION

OF THE MILITIA OF CANADA.

PRESIDENT :

MAJOR GENERAL E. T. H. HUTTON, C.B., A.D.C. to the Queen,
Commanding the Canadian Troops.

VICE-PRESIDENTS :

Lieut.-Col. H. H. McLEAN, 62nd Fusiliers	St. John, N.B.
Lieut.-Col. F. WHITLEY, D. of C. R. C. Hussars	Montreal, Que.
Lieut.-Col. The Hon. J. M. GIBSON, 13th Battalion A.D.C.	Hamilton, Ont.

COUNCIL :

Lieut.-Col. J. MASON, R. O.	Toronto, Ont.
Lieut.-Col. J. B. MACLEAN, D. of Y.R.C. Hussars.	Montreal, Que.
Lieut.-Col. LABELLE, 65th Battalion	" "
Lieut.-Col. JONES, Royal Rifles	Quebec, "
Major W. C. MACDONALD, 48th Highlanders	Toronto, Ont.
Lieut.-Col. STARKE, R.O.	Montreal, Que.
Lieut.-Col. BELL, 57th Battalion	Peterborough, Ont.
Lieut.-Col. BUSTEED, Victoria Rifles	Montreal, Que.
Lieut.-Col. HODGINS, G.G.F.G., ...	Ottawa, Ont.
Major J. S. HENDRIE, 2nd Brigade Division F.A.	Hamilton, Ont.

SECRETARY-TREASURER :

Captain FRANCIS JOSEPH DIXON, R.O., 505 Board of Trade....	Montreal, Que.
--	----------------

THE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE MILITIA OF CANADA.

The first semi-annual meeting of the Officers' Association of the Militia was held in the Railway Committee room, House of Commons, Ottawa, on Wednesday, April 5, 1899. Major-General Hutton, C.B., A.D.C., president, in the chair.

General Hutton, in opening the meeting, said that the minutes of the previous meeting having been printed in a booklet and circulated, it might not be considered necessary to have them read.

On motion of Lieut.-Col. McLean, 62nd Fusiliers, seconded by Major Macdonald, 48th Highlanders, the minutes were taken as read and adopted.

General Hutton then referred to his preface and to the letter he had written the Secretary, both of which were printed in the booklet, in regard to the amalgamation of the Officers' Association and the United Service Club. The General emphasized what he had written in his letter, that union is strength, and did not consider that there was room in Canada for two associations with practically the same object. He was of opinion that a service organization, whether called a club or institute was immaterial, centralized in Ottawa, would make a rendez-vous for officers from all over Canada, and would be of incalculable value to the service. Such a club or institute would contain a military library in which books of a technical nature would be available as well as the official publications of the War Office. In his opinion, a well-stocked military library was essential to Canadian military progress. A military museum was most necessary, as there were many valuable records, flags, arms, etc., stored away, which were of the greatest possible historical interest. Such a club or institute would be modelled somewhat after that of The Royal United Service Institution in England, and there would be a resident and non-resident scale of subscription. The General also laid great stress on the absolute necessity of the Government and military officers taking hold of such projects, as they would give a great and necessary impetus to the military affairs of this young country.

The importance of military institutes was mentioned, and the advantage pointed out of having officers meet to discuss freely and frankly their different troubles, ideas and suggestions. The General looked upon such institutes as the greatest possible assistance to the military authorities. Papers, essays and lectures, could be delivered, followed by discussion, in which officers of all ranks could take part. The Officers' Association could be the means of bringing officers of all ranks together from all over Canada.

The Council of the association had discussed the subject, and, with a view to meet the expressed wishes of the United Service Club, he submitted a report from Council, the adoption of which he moved.

REPORT OF COUNCIL.

The Council of the Officers' Association of the Militia of Canada having considered the position of the association generally, and having further considered the letter of the president, dated February 11, and printed on page 7 of the association's booklet, is of opinion that the time has arrived to consider the advisability of amalgamation with the older association, the Canadian United Service Club. The Council fully endorse the principle suggested by the president that "Union is strength, and in no concern of life so truthfully as in things military."

The Council is also of opinion that the two institutions thus amalgamated will be in a position to take a leading part as a military institution of Canada, not only from the numbers of the two institutions combined, but also from its central position at Ottawa, the capital of Canada.

Such an institute would be of service to the officers of the Ottawa brigade and other officers, past and present, resident at Ottawa. It would, moreover, be useful to officers whose military duties, or whose professional necessities in civil life, would bring them to the capital from time to time. Following upon the lines of similar institutes in Canada and other parts of the Empire, it would be of special advantage to have rooms allotted for the use of its members, to which might be added a military museum. There are now at Ottawa, and elsewhere in Canada, in charge of the Militia Department, a sufficient number of old regimental colours, guns, arms, weapons and other articles of historical interest to make such a museum not only of value to the militia force, but of historical interest to the country at large. In view of the fact, moreover, that no library of military books of reference exists in Canada for general use, it is highly desirable that such a library should be created. The Council is disposed to hope that the Government, viewing the importance of establishing a military museum on account of its military interest, and of a military library of educational value to the troops of the Dominion, might be disposed to give assistance to the proposed institute.

The Council propose for consideration of the meeting the following resolution: "That an amalgamation of the Officers' Association of the Militia of Canada be made with the Canadian United Service Club, and that both institutions should nominate a committee from their respective managing bodies with a view to considering the most suitable and advantageous manner by which this amalgamation should take place."


Lieut.-Col. J. Mason seconded the motion, and said that the Council had carefully considered the question, and was prepared to meet the views of the United Service Club for an amalgamation. He quite agreed with the General as to the advisability of establishing a military institute in Ottawa, and cited the Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, as one which had done an immense deal of good to the militia. Lieut.-Col. Gibson approved of the recommenda-

tion
on
inst
am
ass
part
use,
esta
som
carr

"T
be n
Serv
was

tion of the Council, and supported the establishment of an institute in Ottawa on the lines of the Canadian Military Institute, Toronto. He felt sure such an institute would widen the sphere of usefulness of this association, as discussions among militia officers could take place on the lines and for the object that this association was founded. He hoped a military reference library would form part of the institute, where books, papers, etc., would be available for general use, and where books would be bound and preserved. If such an institute were established in Ottawa by this association he promised his sympathy, and possibly something more substantial from the Ontario Government. The motion was carried.

Another report from Council was presented by General Hutton as follows: "That, if the foregoing motion be adopted, a sub-committee of three members be nominated by the president to meet a like number of the Canadian United Service Club with reference to the above result." The adoption of this report was moved by General Hutton and seconded by Lieut.-Col. Labelle and carried.



aving
urther
page
consi-
adian
ed by
hfully

mated
anada,
om its

rigade
eover,
cies in
g upon
would
ers, to
, and
number
istorical
but of
er, that
e, it is
disposed
military
educa-
assistance

ng reso-
ilitia of
n insti-
bodies
y which

ncil had
s of the
General
nd cited
mmense
menda-

.. THE...

OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION

OF THE MILITIA OF CANADA.

LECTURE ON

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CANADIAN ARMY.

By CAPTAIN CHARLES F. WINTER, Adjutant The G.G. Foot Guards, Silver Medalist, the Royal United Service Institution.

DELIVERED AFTER THE SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING, IN THE RAILWAY COMMITTEE ROOM, HOUSE OF COMMONS, OTTAWA, ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL, 5th, 1899, AT 9.30 P.M.

MAJOR GENERAL E. T. H. HUTTON C.B., A.D.C. to the Queen,
President, in the Chair.

YOUR EXCELLENCY, GENERAL HUTTON AND GENTLEMEN:

In Canada we have seldom looked upon our National Militia as an "army," but I am sure most of you will have marked with feelings of satisfaction the introduction and publicly reiterated application of that term to the defensive forces of our Dominion by our new General Officer Commanding since his arrival amongst us last September.

The possession of an "army" distinctly implies a higher standing, both in the military forces themselves and the country maintaining them; since, in the modern military acceptance of that term, it means something very much more than a scattered aggregation of units of the different arms, and to the military mind conveys marked implication of progress and improvement.

An "army" may be defined as a complete fighting machine, made up, like all other machines, of various component parts, the incorporation of each of which is essential before the finished product can be worthy of the name—the instrument possessed by nations and sovereign states for, not only their protection at home, but the enforcement of respect abroad by virtue of the possession of that material power which moral right still requires among men to obtain in all cases that recognition which is its due. In the past, colonies have seldom possessed armies, but Canada of recent years has made such

strid
the
othe
and
citiz
our
Fran
men
" ar
ing
tion
disti

Past

stitu
settl
am
mili
mili
your
reco

his
Mil
ther
wer
sim
who
hop
cou
The
the
at t
taki
The
the
D'A
kni
cap

strides in every other way—social, political and commercial—that it is not in the least unnatural that we should desire to see her equipped with what all other nations find absolutely necessary to their national integrity, importance, and independence. Not indeed a “standing” army, but a militia, a purely citizen force, which in itself forms a real “army.” To trace the evolution of our native Canadian force from its first inception in the early days of New France to the present, and then to outline what is believed to be the requirements essential to continue that evolution until we are provided with an “army,” in all the fulness of its modern military meaning, as well as suggesting a few ways whereby our Officers’ Association can assist in such consummation, is my task to-night, a pleasant one indeed in view of the numbers and distinguished presence of my brother officers.

I propose treating the subject under three general headings: I. The Past. II. The Present, and III. The Future.

PART I—THE PAST.

Our present Canadian militia force, as the successor of similarly constituted bodies, always present in greater or smaller numbers since the early settlement of New France, has a most creditable and historical past—in fact I am sufficiently bold to assert that I believe it to have a more distinguished military record of past usefulness than can be placed to the credit of any other militia in existence. This is a broad claim, but I would respectfully request your forbearance for a short space while we review very briefly the interesting records of the past.

Mr. Benjamin Sulte, our Canadian historian of the Militia Department, in his interesting and instructive paper on the “Early History of the Canadian Militia, 1636–1700,” tells us that the first formation of a militia in Canada, then New France, was in 1651, when the settlers at Quebec and Three Rivers were formed into militia squads by M. d’Ailleboust. Montreal effected a similar organization in 1663. In passing I may mention that the sixteen men who died with Dollard at the Long Sault in 1660 were not, as we might have hoped, Canadian militiamen, but were old countrymen serving under old country pay, and at the time comprised the entire garrison of Montreal. These early militia squads, however, were merely local bodies, organized for the protection of their own homes against the Iroquois and other Indian tribes, at that time all-powerful in this country. Each captain acted independently, taking his instructions from the nearest commandant of the regular troops. The various units wore the simplest of uniforms, and were known generally by the name of their commander. Thus the Montreal men were “Montrealers D’Ailleboust,” and were distinguished by blue great coats and blue tuques or knitted worsted caps. The Three Rivers men wore a white great coat and cap, while the Quebec men were habited in red.

Under the Count de Frontenac, in 1673, the militia was further advanced by the enrolment of every man in the colony able to bear arms, and a captain chosen from amongst the *habitants* was put at the head of each parish. The drill and training of the period consisted almost exclusively of shooting, their skill in this respect giving them at the time a decided advantage over their savage enemies, against whose incursions they had to be always on the alert and very frequently under arms.

In 1684 the great war with the Iroquois, which lasted for seventeen years, broke out. Ten independent companies of 500 men had arrived from France, and with these and others which arrived at intervals as reinforcements, the companies of the militia were brigaded throughout the operations. This may be cited as the first occasion upon which our Canadian militia were brigaded with regular troops.

After the cessation of hostilities with the Iroquois in 1701, but few months elapsed before the beginning of another series of armed conflicts with the English colonies to the south of the St. Lawrence, and which was to continue intermittently until 1760. The same system as formerly was followed by the French home authorities. Few regular troops were sent out from France until nearly the close of the war—only one or two companies of regulars being scattered here and there—thus entailing upon the militia of the colony the onerous duty of sustaining the war, as well as bearing its after consequences. Mr. Sulte, in concluding his historical sketch of these early days, asserts that the events of 1760 put an end to the Canadian militia, but I think most of us will agree that if the old regime died on the Plains of Abraham a new one took its place very shortly afterwards, one that has been proud to succeed to its old record, proud of the militia's previous achievements, and seeing in them still an inspiration to continue on seeking after ever-increasing efficiency—with the Canadian militia a reference to the Plains of Abraham must ever bring to mind the phrase, "*Le Roi est mort; vive le Roi.*"

As a matter of fact, however, the Canadian militia of the old regime did not die out with the events of 1760. Under General Amherst's arrangements after the capitulation of Montreal, the Canadian captains of militia were to retain authority in their parishes and were to settle civil differences between the inhabitants in accordance with their old laws; and, in cases of appeal to the Governor, a council of the captains was to assist with its advice. That the historic continuity of the militia of Canada was not broken by the transfer of authority in 1760, and the disarming of the rank and file of the local bodies, is also apparent from the fact that all officers of militia surrendering their French commissions were in exchange issued English ones by the Governor. (Kingsford, vol. iv., p. 441). Upon the departure of General Gage from Montreal to replace General Amherst as commander-in-chief at New York in 1762, the Canadian captains of militia presented him with an address, in reply to which he urged them to continue their services for the public welfare *as heretofore*.

Under the British regime, the first employment of the militia upon active service would seem to be that of three provisional companies of volunteers, made up from the local militia of Montreal, Three Rivers and Quebec, for service with Bradstreet's expedition to the West in 1764. Three hundred Canadians participated, with the regulars, and contingents from the American colonies to the south of the St. Lawrence.

It was, however, during the critical days of 1775-6, during the Congressional invasion of those years, that the militia of Canada passed through its greatest ordeal. The historical records of those times are replete with instances both of devotion to duty and King George on the part of some of the militia, and the satisfactory response in some sections to the call for volunteers; but, at the same time on the other hand, of neglect, indifference, and even open hostility from other units of the force. In 1775 the militia were called out according to the provisions of the old law, reinstating the officers who had served under the French administration, and calling them out under their old ranks, except in a few cases where they had declined or neglected to take the oath of allegiance. At St. Johns and Montreal the militia rendered good service, but it was during the siege of Quebec by Generals Richard Montgomery and Benedict Arnold, throughout the long winter of 1775-6, that the militia performed services beyond value in helping to retain Canada for the British Crown. During this memorable defence by Sir Guy Carleton the garrison of Quebec consisted of 1,796 all told. Of these more than half, or 73 officers and 827 N. C. O. and men, 900 altogether, were Canadian militiamen.

It was, however, during the war of 1812-14 that the Canadian militia made its greatest records. All Canadians are aware of the examples then set, and to-night time would not allow of my touching upon them more than to allude to the most important incidents. "Queenstown Heights," "Lundy's Lane" and "Chateauguay" are still names to conjure with throughout the Canadas, and the dying words of the immortal Sir Isaac Brock, "Push on, brave York volunteers!" should ever be an inspiration to our Canadian militia. "Chrysler's Farm," "Beaver Dam," "Lacolle," are among the battle honours of our militia, where, with a solid corps or stiffener of Imperial British infantry, small in number, but incomparable as an example in all the qualities most requiring imitation by a territorial force, they repeatedly hurled back the invader and kept Canada in her integrity inviolate. Again in 1837, in 1866, and 1870, the militia were called upon for active service. Each of these periods might well furnish material for a separate lecture, but I take it for granted their performances are sufficiently well known to you to obviate any extended reference on my part, especially as my main object is to endeavour to concentrate your attention rather upon the conditions under which they served, viz.: in conjunction with and under the tutelage of Imperial regular troops.

The militias of the past have always been more or less local bodies,

initiated for local defence only, and to supplement the garrisons throughout the country with a cheap auxiliary. Commissions, under the old French regime, were never granted for a higher rank than captain, except in some rare cases, when that of major was accorded, and since 1760 that of lieutenant-colonel, the underlying motive being that there should be no question at any time of the seniority and control of the regular officers. From the inception and formation of the militias, these auxiliaries have been wholly dependent upon the regular forces for leading, the guidance and direction of a staff, for medical attention and comforts, hospitals, etc., and in all matters of ammunition and supply. During peace their officers qualified more or less efficiently, according to the zeal and interest of the commandants at the various military centres;—as the force progressed, N. C. O.'s from the regular regiments were loaned as instructors during the training period—on taking the field they formed part of the defensive armies with the regulars; received all their supplies from them, or through their officers or administrative departments. Thus, while on paper the militias of the Canadas may be termed the national army of the colonies, they were in reality nothing more than a militia adjunct of the national army of the Mother Country. This feeling of dependence, not perhaps expressed but nevertheless existent, must still be recognized as responsible for a great deal of the deficiencies existing in our militia force to-day. In 1867 we attained national manhood, and, when effecting Confederation, took upon ourselves, in addition to complete self-government, the added responsibilities of our own primary land defence. Now, notwithstanding that the Militia Act, under which our present force is constituted and regulated, provides for the service of our Dominion military forces abroad, if necessary, as well as within the confines of the Dominion, that ingrained feeling of dependence must have been very strong indeed to have lasted, as it has, to the present, since so little has been done to create for ourselves those departments of supply, etc., of which by the withdrawal of the Imperial troops in 1870 we were deprived; and these props, upon which we had aforesaid leaned in times of danger and requirement, have never yet been replaced. This is by no means new. Successive G. O. C.'s, since 1867, have pointed out the need of some organization to provide at least the skeleton framework for these departmental corps. As, however, we seemed well over our troubles after the Fenian raids of '66 and '70 and the Red River expedition of the latter year, in all of which we had the guidance and leading as of old, as well as having civil undertakings in hand which, in view of our immense area and limited population, were gigantic, our people have always deferred the evil day, as many called it, when they will set their house in order and approve the expenditures necessary to provide those accessories, no less indispensable than squadrons, batteries and battalions, to compose a national army, whether of citizen militia or regular troops. So, when we hear, as we often do, that because our militia did such and such in 1812 or 1775-6, the same can be done again, let us call to mind that the conditions are now very dissimilar, and that we have not yet begun to replace many of those old supports which served Canada so well in

early years. "1885" is also a favorite quotation, but we can scarcely count again upon a prairie for campaigning ground, or that our opponents in future will be so lacking in aggression and initiative as were the Indians and Half Breeds of the Northwest; besides, the numbers then mobilized were less than one-seventh of our organized strength, but they nevertheless imposed a strain which makes one glad we did not require the whole. At the same time the accomplishments of our citizen soldiery in 1885 must always remain a source of very considerable pride to every Canadian. For the first time in our history our national force was enabled, unaided by any Imperial troops, to restore peace to our Western Territories. Many of our arrangements were poor and faulty, and our departments were of course improvised for the occasion; still, at a distance of over 2,000 miles from our Capital, there occurred no break-downs of medical, transport or supply arrangements; no man wanted for good rations, and the sick and wounded were well cared for. On the other hand, it is quite true the conduct of operations was on a small scale; the arrangements for supply, etc., were never seriously tested, our railway communications were always secure, and there were no military operations conducted in the face of a bold and enterprising enemy such as may be expected in the case of a civilized and well-armed foe. Should we not, however, gauge our requirements, not by what suited against an inferior and poorly armed enemy, but rather what we know from the experiences of others is essential to success against a modernly armed and equipped opponent.

The past of our militias may be thus briefly summarized:—Uniformly successful because acting in conjunction with Imperial regular troops, who furnished leaders and the administrative services of all kinds. We have been now nearly thirty years without the regular troops—is it not time we began seriously to replace those aids withdrawn with them?

PART II.—THE PRESENT.

It would seem almost superfluous in talking to an audience the majority of whom are members of our Active Militia, to speak at any great length upon the present condition of our organized defensive forces, but that such is in itself the very *crux* of the whole question. Besides, it does seem to me that at certain periods it is always well to take stock of our resources. It is a sound rule in commerce—it is a rule, observed by prudent individuals in their own affairs. As Canadians, then, as soldiers in her Active Militia, it is well that we should examine the present so as to discover its deficiencies and defects, with a view to an improvement for the future. We may revel in the past with its rich stores of soul-stirring deeds—we may glory in projects for the future, and the fit condition in which we hope to see our "Army," but the base from which we must build the ideal National Force for our Dominion's safety, must, perforce, be the citizen soldiery of the present day. We must therefore first thoroughly understand the exact position of our defences, their capabili-

ties, efficiency, or otherwise, for the purposes for which established and maintained, and whether or not they give due promise of ability to perform satisfactorily the important duties which in the event of interruption in our Empire's present peaceful relations with all the world, would be universally expected from them on all sides. The occasion for this study is opportune. In the first place we have enjoyed a long period of peaceful security—a condition not calculated in itself to improve a country's defence. In the second, the year that has just past has been momentous both in the general history of our Empire with grave dangers verging on war at different times; and with the remarkable rapprochement between the people of the Mother country and our neighbours of the United States; and thirdly, by the great change in the condition and aspirations of the latter—the large increases in their military and naval establishments and their commitment to a policy of Colonial expansion.

The organized defensive forces of the Dominion to-day have an established strength of 36,204 officers and men, with 3,715 horses. This Force consists of cavalry 2,607, artillery, 4,497 with 114 guns. Engineers, 212, and Infantry 28,889; and is composed of 863 officers and men belonging to Permanent Units, (practically "Regular," though theoretically "embodied militia") and 35,342 active militia proper, these latter being again subdivided into 10,212 officers and men of City Corps, and 25,992 officers and men of Units in rural districts. Of this Force, however, only 25,296, or 71% received any training at all last year; while according, to the Dominion Census of 1891, we have in the Country 657,788 men of military age, capable of bearing arms and who could be taken for service if need be. Speaking generally and broadly we have the very best of assurances for believing that the above enumerated organized force is, on the whole, composed of very excellent personnel—it has very lately been re-armed at considerable expense—the Artillery with new breach-loading 12 pdrs., and the Infantry (though the distribution to all Units is not yet completed) with "Lee-Enfield" magazine rifles, (and about to be provided with the Oliver equipment), in addition to a certain number of Maxim machine guns already distributed. Facilities for the training of our officers in all the preliminary and elementary work is afforded by the various Royal Schools of military instructions, and one may perhaps say, so far as armament and the preliminary training of its officers is concerned, there are few militia forces in the world our superior. Upon these points therefore we may be assumed to have evolved very materially in a forward direction since the days of "The Montrealers d'Ailleboust." It is, however, when contrasting the organized strength maintained just after Confederation and for some years subsequent to the passage of the Militia Act, and the organization of our present Force, with its aggregate to-day, and the known difficulty of getting full musters at inspections, that one is inclined to say, in this respect at any rate our evolution has not been at all satisfactory.

Chap. 41, of the revised Statutes of Canada provides for the control and government of the armed defenders of the Dominion, and while in enacting

that the Militia of the country shall consist of every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 45, stipulates that the number to be tained in any one year shall not exceed 45,000 men. The numbers maintained and trained in some of the years immediately subsequent to the passage of this Act were as follows :

1869—43,541, with 25 additional corps enrolled, but Government was unable at the time to provide the necessary arms and uniforms—these made the total number in reality over 45,000.

1870—number trained, 44,519.

Of course the Fenian disturbances on our borders and the expedition to the Red River explains very much these figures, since in 1877, notwithstanding that our area to guard had in the meantime been much increased by the entry into the Dominion of British Columbia, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island, the numbers fell to 23,000, and have ever since varied from the latter figure to about 35,000, or, roughly, one Corps d'Armée.

These numbers, drawn by purely voluntary enlistment from a much smaller population than we boast to-day, certainly show that we have gone backwards in the position of the Forces for defence, in so far as numbers are concerned. We have, however, gone distinctly forward in other directions, even outside of armament and equipment. Our Officers and N. C. Os., on the whole, are decidedly superior in professional attainments (owing to facilities of the Military Schools) to their predecessors of similar ranks in 1867-70—many still remain in regimental ranks who had the practical experience of actual service in 1885—and we are commanded by an Officer of tried experience and first-class reputation, who in the short time he has been with us has already won the confidence of all in a singular degree. We have however, lost the collective example and guidance of the Imperial Regulars who for over a 100 years were the inspiration and mentors of our Militias. Our Permanent Corps, valuable as they have been, and are, cannot, owing to their very limited establishments, but in part make up for the withdrawal of the Regulars in 1870. The old guides to which our predecessors looked in 1775-6, 1812-14, 1837-8, 1866 and 1870, are no longer permanently with us, except upon the extreme confines of our Dominion—their administrative departments of all kinds are no longer here to rely upon, and at present we can scarcely see anything that has been established to take their place. Speaking generally, we are still a certain number of battallions of Infantry of varying strengths and value, a few engineers, and cavalry, a fair artillery, with a small lot of, on the whole, patient and pains-taking men as teachers and instructors in the Permanent Corps, but these altogether are in no military sense, as yet, an army, or even a complete Military organization. In the light of very recent campaigns, we all now know that any military force which does not include the proportion of all arms, viz :—infantry, artillery, engineers, and cavalry, with the administrative departments requisite to feed, clothe, supply with ammunition and war material, etc., as well as care properly for the sick and wounded and provide means of trans-

portion, &c., is more or less valueless for practical military operations in the present day.

Our condition to-day is so closely allied to that of the U. S. prior to the war with Spain, that a few illustrations from their experience may not be inopportune at this stage. As is well-known the United States entered upon that war with its military mechanism antiquated and out of gear—almost everything to complete an army for actual service in the field had to be done at the last moment—they had to create in the best way they could a General Staff; there administrative departments were, in comparison with the work to be done, virtually non-existent. General William A. Bancroft, an old-time veteran of previous U. S. armies, formed and developed in the fire of their great Civil Struggle, on "Faults of the Army and its Officers as the War Developed them in Camp," says:—

U.S. "Army and Naval Journal." 5th November 1898.

"The maintenance of an efficient military machine is a great expense. The American nation has not chosen to bear the expense; hence its military machine was not efficient. The Country made its choice. It saved its money. It has lost, and is now losing, the lives and health of many of its soldiers. To say nothing of becoming an efficient fighting machine, demanding arms, ammunition and equipment of a most effective description, an army must know how to keep its soldiers alive and well so as to be prepared to fight. A dead man surely cannot fight, and a sick man only feebly or perhaps not at all. The business of war, like other businesses, can be learned only by study and practice. There is no more time between wars than is needed to prepare for them. Assembling 250,000 men does not make an army. It simply makes 250,000 men. To make an army requires time. There is involved not only proficiency in drill and skill in the use of weapons, but also a certain habit of life not easy to acquire, except in years."

Of the sufferings entailed upon individuals serving in the war as well as the humiliation imposed on those at home by reason of such occurring as the direct result of their own indifference and neglect as citizens of the Republic, it is not necessary to speak here. A single glance at one instance of what was the first results will suffice. Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, late in command of the 1st Regt. of U. S. Volunteer Cavalry ("The Rough Riders") in his evidence on 22nd November last (1898) before the President's Commission on the conduct of the war in Cuba, said:—

(New York Daily Papers 23rd November 1898.)

"When we reached Tampa, we had 24 hours of utter and absolute confusion. There was no one to show us where we were to camp.

The railroad system was in a state of absolute congestion. We were dumped down miles outside of the camp ground. We were kept there till evening. I had to take matters into my own hands so as to get my horses watered and fed, and get provision for my troops. On arrival at Port Tampa there was the same state of confusion. There were 10,000 men swarming over the quay. Transports were pulling in from midstream, but nobody could tell what transports the troops were to get on. The Quartermaster was found after much hunting, and assigned the Rough Riders to the "Yucatan." But two of the Regiments had also been assigned to it, and they could not all get on. So the Rough Riders simply took it by storm and held it against all comers. The other regiments who had been assigned to the same boat had to stay on the train two days.

The supplies were insufficient and there were no transport facilities to convey them to the troops. Instead of the Rough Riders having 25 waggons they had only one, and sometimes none at all. The Rough Riders got food from the Spaniards and foraged for themselves. Colonel Roosevelt also provided for them out of his own pocket from the stores meant for officers, and on the whole they did not fare badly. Men from other regiments were starving and came to pick up their scraps. The medical supplies were entirely insufficient. Through no fault of the doctors, the condition of the wounded in the rear, during and immediately after an engagement was appalling. There were not enough doctors, and they were kept working at the operating tables when they could hardly keep their eyes open for want of sleep. Some of the men after having legs or arms amputated, were taken right out in the jungle and left in the grass. Sometimes they stayed there 24 or 36 hours with a leg or arm off, and with nobody even to come to them to give them a drink of water. But they had to be taken there. There was no place else to take them and nobody to take care of them. There were no cots for the wounded. After being operated upon, if they had blankets, they lay in the mud on their blankets. If they didn't have blankets they lay in the mud without blankets.

These are not exaggerations, but facts testified to by a responsible Officer, who has since been placed by his countrymen in the high position of Governor of the great State of New York, and these things occurred with a comparatively small force of some 17,000 men, mostly all Regulars, and in the preparation of which for field service had been concentrated in the first instance the whole force and strength of the great U. S. for at least two months. The trouble was lack of a trained staff and the absence of efficient Departmental Corps. On the other hand, the value of being prepared was perhaps never illustrated to better advantage than in the case of the Royal Navy at the time of the Fashoda inci-

dent with France last Sept. and Oct. We all can recall the pride with which we read in the daily despatches of the naval state of readiness for any eventuality, and we know to-day that such state of readiness and preparation prevented war. As an example of the nature of those preparations it may not be amiss to quote very briefly from a speech of one of the Permanent Under Secretaries of State (Sir Ralph Knox) in October last. He went on to say :—

“ The efforts of their last two Governments had been very great in the direction of strengthening their fleet, not only in building ships, but also in preparing every single item which those ships might require, and that at a moment's notice. Every shell and every box of cordite in the dockyards was marked with the name of the ship on board of which it would be put when once the orders of the Admiralty were received ; even flasks of wine for administering the last communion to the dying seamen had been provided.”

Thus we see that while the lack of military or naval preparation invites disaster, a proper state of business-like readiness prevents it. The experiences of the Spanish war show conclusively that the necessary things cannot be done if left to the last moment ; and it is no exaggeration at all to say that these occurrences just described, and which entailed so much useless suffering, would beduplicated in Canada to-morrow were our Force called out in any numbers for immediate and actual service. In the U. S. they were the natural results of the lack of a proper and competent staff, an absence of adequate administrative departments, and that preparation before hand which is essential to success in modern warfare. In our smaller way, and suited to our own peculiar requirements, should we not take steps, while we may, to profit by these war time experiences of our neighbours ?

The main great duties of our Militia may be generally classified as follows :—

1st. The support and maintenance of the Civil Law and Order within the territories of the Dominion.

2nd. The primary defence of Canada against invasion.

3rd. Assistance in the defence of the Empire and assumption of the “ offensive-defensive ” for such purpose.

Since 1885 when such ability was practically tested over 2,000 miles away from the centres of the older Provinces, no one has questioned the efficiency of our Force to successfully perform its duties under the first heading.

A consideration of the second duty opens up very grave matters and brings forward a number of questions upon which Canadians have views and opinions almost as varied as their climate. We cannot altogether forget that while we

have but one-tenth of the population of the Empire, outside of India, Africa, and the smaller dependencies, we have $\frac{1}{3}$ of the whole Imperial area to guard, alongside of a sleeping giant. The giant's hands we know are just now much occupied, and his disposition is most friendly—may such always continue,—but, at the same time, we cannot forget altogether the Venezuelan incident, and how outside matters of which we have no control may provoke his dislike or envy. Just as the self-reliant and able individual is generally the most respected, so with nations—those able and strong enough to take care of themselves are always the least interfered with.

Speaking of any unfortunate misunderstanding between Great Britain and the U. S., Captain Levita of the R. A., the officer who commanded the R. A. Garrison Co., from Halifax which exchanged stations with our own Royal Canadian Artillery at Quebec last summer, says in the Journal of the R. U. S. I. for January last upon the Inter Oceanic Canal at Panama:—

“With the present inadequate and incompetent Canadian Defence and Militia arrangements, there can be little doubt that the outlook would be serious. As a matter of interest, and but known to few, it is noteworthy that had the Venezuelan affair proceeded to its full possibilities, three columns would have been launched into Canada; one to seize the canals giving access to the St. Lawrence, one through the State of Maine to cut the Railways, and the third to the West near Medicine Hat.”

(R. U. S. I Journal, Vol. XLIII, No 251, January 1899.)

Our present General Officer Commanding in his very able paper on “A Co-operative System for the Defence of the Empire,” read before the Imperial & Colonial Institute in 1897, referring to the assistance expected from the various component parts of the Empire in the defence of the whole, says:—

“It will be readily conceded by all observers of recent events in our history that a mutual, though unwritten, understanding exists between all portions of the Queen's Dominions. The ties of sentiment and of self-interest alike render the maintenance of the Empire necessary for commercial and political development to each and all. A study of history, especially that of our own country, demonstrates most clearly that the means by which this can best be effected is by an “offensive-defensive” system of defence.

We will all, I am sure, have no hesitation in saying that General Hutton's idea of mutual and reciprocal assistance by all parts of the Empire, in case of attack upon any portion of it, will find no more hearty corroboration than among the members of that force of which he is now the military head. Twice in past years has Canada shown her willingness, aye eagerness, to participate

in Imperial campaigns, and, although the force sent forward was on each occasion small, they well illustrate the feelings of our people in regard to assistance in wars of Imperial import. In neither case, however, did they form part of any plan of action that could be termed the "offensive-defensive." The cases referred to were:—1st. The raising of the "100th" Regiment in Canada to aid in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, 1857-8; and 2ndly, the despatch of the "Canadian Voyageurs" to the Nile and the Soudan in 1884-5. In both these cases, however, the corps in question were maintained by the Imperial Government, and Canada did really nothing more than provide the men in the first instance. We do not, however, to-day understand our participation in the "offensive-defensive" to merely and solely consist of that. The militia view, at any rate, will always be that in any case where Canada's co-operation is required, she will not only find the officers and men, with their equipment, etc., but will also maintain them in the field as a Canadian contingent serving in the interests of the whole Empire during a period of hostilities.

The first great consideration that must strike any Canadian in putting on his thinking cap in connection with the present affairs of the national defences of his country, is the status, or position, as a whole, which the citizen force to-day occupies in the eyes of the vast majority of its fellow-countrymen. Is it regarded and considered as the appreciated defensive arm, the protector of their institutions and liberties—are its companies and battalions the pride and darling of their various localities, and is their efficiency jealously regarded by all the civil authorities? Are the young men who lead and those who fill the ranks for pure love of it—for of course commercially speaking there is nothing in it for anyone—are they encouraged and sustained by their employers, by the men of solid substance in their communities, whose credit and prosperity are in every way enhanced by the existence of such a force, even as we are at present, with all our shortcomings—are they doing by the Force as they should to assist in making it what it must be before it can be truly said to be on the highway towards that goal of comparative perfection necessary before it can be said to be thoroughly capable of undertaking its greatest duties as a national "army." The public estimation of its military forces in time of peace has been proven from experience to be a very sure gauge of the ability of a nation to successfully defend its territories in the day of stress and danger. In the days of ancient Rome the public estimation of the legionary, who gave his personal military service for the good of all, was of the very highest character—to bear arms for the benefit of the whole community was the most honourable of callings, as well as the badge of freedom, since all slaves and dependents were debarred from such public service. Hence the efficiency of the legions was the personal business and concern of every citizen, and their military fitness at all times a constant source of jealous regard on the part of everyone. To enumerate their successes, based primarily upon such attention and regard, would be superfluous here. On the other hand, we have well-known instances of results where the low public opinion of the people's defenders has led to the very re-

verse. To take the recent case of Spain—notwithstanding that we know her poor half-starved conscripts before Santiago fought manfully and well—Leonard Williams, an English correspondent, travelling in Spain the winter before last, writes thus in the Magazine of the R. U. S. I. for April, 1897 :—

“ In Spain the armed troops are held in social contempt, which is in no way counterbalanced by the reiteration before every officer's name of ‘ bizarro ’ (smart) and other fatuous epithets of the press. The army and the church, in fact, are the two professions no man chooses if he has the money or the brains to choose anything else, and a girl who threatens to become an old maid is told in jest by her sisters that she will have to marry an officer, which illustrates the national bias”

The case of China is even more glaring. At the time of the war with Japan the system of recruiting in vogue was neither voluntary or compulsory service as we understand it, and she had to depend largely upon armed defenders in the shape of hastily collected vagrants and criminals, sent to serve in the army as a counter punishment to the death or imprisonment to which they had been sentenced previously. The soldier was looked down upon, and very naturally, when badly wanted, was found both utterly unable and unwilling to take upon himself the successful defence of a country that had treated him so harshly. To show how very low down indeed the military defences of a country can descend through the national indifference and neglect of a people, the following extract from the U. S. “ Army and Navy Journal ” of 26th Nov. last, giving the experience of a Swedish explorer recently returned from travelling in China, may be quoted :—

“ A regiment of Chinese troops would possess among them “ about half a dozen English guns and an equal number of Russian, the remainder being armed with bows and lances. The “ guns were in a wretched condition, the soldiers taking no care “ whatever of them. He had seen soldiers place their rifles in a “ muddy stream and use them as a pole to vault across. In a “ squad of cavalry about a dozen horses would be in a fair condition, the remainder old hacks, impossible to turn to any account. “ Parades and shooting are very rare among the garrisons. The “ soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers pass their time “ in eating, drinking, and smoking opium. In counting their “ men they not only number up the individuals, but their arms, “ their boots, and their different pieces of uniform, bringing out “ the most astounding totals, which greatly flatter the pride of the “ commandants.”

Nothing like this could, of course, occur were any popular interest mani-

fested by the Chinese in their army, and general defensive forces. Their example will but serve to show how down at heel a military force can become through the apathy and lack of public spirit on the part of the general citizens. Of course no one hints that any semblance to such a rotten state of affairs exists in Canada; but our ideals are high, our civilization the most advanced, our people one of the most intelligent in the world; hence it is to be expected that the public estimation of our defenders should approach more the ideal of the ancient and successful Roman than that of the antiquated though incompetent Chinese. But, as a matter of fact, what are our present day conditions? Do the citizens rise up and want to know the reason why in localities where battalions have become weak or "run down?" Do prominent citizens with a large stake in the community ever show public concern that indifference and neglect, and the passive, if not active, antagonism of employers of labour is weakening the only reserve back of their civic police contingents? Seldom is it indeed that we see such interrogation, though it does not seem at all unreasonable, in view of its importance, that such should be expected in a people as wide awake to their own interests as are our own. The maintenance of the militia is after all simply a policy of national insurance, and as such ought to be of prime interest and importance to all people, and particularly to leaders of thought and action in our communities. None are quicker to add to their private insurance as their business and prospects advance in material prosperity, and none are more prompt in asking for the services of the citizen soldiery in any case of riot or trouble. How true were those words said to have been carved on the walls of Badajos (1812) by a young thinking soldier of the 43rd Light Infantry of Wellington's army:—

"When war is near and danger nigh,
God and the soldier is the cry;
When trouble's o'er and wrongs are righted,
God is forgot and the soldier slighted."

THE QUESTION OF COST.

A consideration of our Canadian military system and what we hope it may attain in the future naturally brings with it the question of cost, and what this means to our people in the way of taxation. Taking the "Consolidated Fund Account" alone, and leaving aside for the moment expenditures in connection with rearmament, which are always very properly charged to Capital Account, we find that our disbursements upon the defensive forces of Canada last year (1897) averaged between 31 and 32 cents per head of the population of the Dominion, and that the training, clothing, pay, maintenance of R. M. C. and schools of instruction, manufacture of ammunition, etc., etc., for our force of 36,000 men, cost on the average about \$44 or \$45 per individual officer, N. C. O. and man. Thus, while the total Federal taxation of our people averaged last year \$5.52 per head ("Statistical Year Book, 1897") the amount devoted

to the national insurance premium in the form of militia expenditures was but 32 cents, or not quite 6 % of the whole, while in 1894 it was but 26 cents and 4.8 % of total taxation—one of the lowest, if not indeed the very lowest, percentage of any country in the world maintaining defensive forces of any kind, notwithstanding that our rates of pay and standards of living and allowances are, when compared upon a monetary basis, much higher than the majority of other countries. It is when contrasting our expenditure for such purposes with the same incurred in other lands that one realizes how very insignificant on the whole have been our appropriations for defence, and how utterly impossible it is to expect that a real army, in the modern acceptance of that term, can be built up for the defence of the country upon such very small allowances.

In quoting the following figures of military expenditures by the various countries of the world, and the proportion of Federal taxation devoted to such purpose, I beg to remark that, of course, no one expects Canada to follow blindly the lead of the Great Powers, whose surroundings and national necessities are so different from our own. Attention is, however, invited to the cases of the smaller and inferior Powers with populations somewhat analagous to ours. The figures given are as much as possible for 1895, and were taken carefully from the following standards:—"Statesman's Year Book, 1896," "Report of U. S. Secretary for War, 1896," and "Statistical Year Book, Canada, 1896 and 1897."

It is, however, well to consider for a moment how very great indeed is the disparity in defensive expenditures between ourselves and these other countries. Not only have we no navy or consular service to maintain in addition to ordinary land forces as they have, but we are also exempted from the individual and national sacrifices entailed by their systems of compulsory service. To turn the latter into a monetary equivalent is well nigh impossible, but the burden and strain imposed upon a people by a system of universal military service must always be considered when making comparisons of this kind between ourselves and most other foreign powers. This, however, seems to still further minimize our defensive expenditures and accentuates the query if it is possible to provide an adequate defence for Canada for so little money.



Statement of Military Strengths and Expenditures of the Principal Nations of the World.

From "Statesman's Year Book, 1896;" "Statistical Year Book of Canada, 1897;" and "Report U.S. Secy. of War for 1896."

COUNTRY.	POP.	Organised Military Strength, 1895.	MILITARY EXPENDITURE.			Total Federal taxation per head of population	Percentage of taxation devoted to Military Purposes.
			TOTALS.	Per man of Organized Strength.	Per head of Pop.		
Austria Hungary	41,358,886 (1890)	1,826,940	136,604,701 Frs. (Budget 1896)	\$ 30.17	\$1.34	\$ 6.67 (1892)	20%
Belgium	6,341,958 (94)	163,082	51,963,452 Frs. (Budget '96)	61.00	1.54	5.40 (94)	28.4%
Denmark	2,185,335 (96)	76,500	10,244,513 Cr. (B. '96-7)	36.18	1.24	5.90 (93-4)	21%
France	38,343,192 (91)	2,500,000	651,174,820 Fr. (Est. '96)	50.25	3.28	11.92 (94)	27.5%
Germany	51,758,364 (95)	3,000,000	472,212,400 Ms. (Exp. '96)	37.50	2.16	6.32 (92-3)	37.3%
Great Britain	40,000,000 (96)	718,821	£20,805,753	135.74	2.24	9.47 (94)	23.6%
Greece	2,187,208 (89)	350,000	15,359,250 D. (95)	8.43	1.35	3.77 (93)	35.8%

Greece	2,187,208 (^{'86})	350,000	15,337,230 L. (^{'95})							(^{'93})	
Italy	30,913,663 (^{'94})	3,435,607	225,982,843 Fr.	12.70	1.35	8.46 (^{'94})	16%				
Japan	41,388,313 (^{'93})	275,000	13,251,722 Yen	48.18	31	1.24 (^{'92-3})	23.1%				
Netherlands	4,795,646 (^{'94})	70,000	23,792,645 G. (B. '96)	137.78	1.95	4.16 (^{'92})	46.8%				
Portugal	5,082,247 (^{'94})	150,000	5,167,958 M. ((Est. '95)	36.81	1.07	8.15 (^{'93-4})	13%				
Roumania	5,800,000 (^{'93})	200,000	41,016 134 Lei. (^{'95-6})	39.50	1.35						
Russia	129,545,000 (^{'95})	2,512,143 (^{'92})	288,521,969 R. (^{'96})	85.69	1.72	3.16 (^{'94})	54.4%				
Spain	17,565,632 (^{'87})	1,083,595	139,486,821 Ps. (B. '95-96)	25.00	1.50	6.35 (^{'93-4})	23.6%				
Sweden and Norway	6,920,000 (^{'94})	535,000	37,110,900 Ks. (B. '96)	18.76	1.48	3.91 (^{'90-1})	37.8%				
Switzerland	2,986,848 (^{'94})	488,614	23,113 639 Fr. (^{'95})	{ 9.13	1.55	2.68 (^{'94})	57.86%				
Turkey	30,000,000 (^{'94})	700,620	? (^{'95})	? {	? Net 1.35	? (^{'94})	? Net 50.3%				
United States	65,000,000 (^{'95})	143,000 Regs. & S. G.	35,925,173 (Exp. '95)	251.22	57/3	4.11 (^{'95})	14%				
Canada	5,050,000 (^{'95})	35,835	1,631,102 (Exp. '95)	45.52	32	5.49 (^{'95})	5.8%				

These figures do not in any case include naval expenditures.

It will be noticed that the largest proportion of taxation devoted to defence is borne by Switzerland, a country whose independence is practically guaranteed by the Great Powers, and which has in its natural geographical features exceptional facilities for defence. Nevertheless, its people prefer to trust rather in their own ability to withstand aggression than in paper guarantees, and to augment their natural resources by a systematic military training of their manhood. Like ourselves they maintain no standing or regular army, their defensive force consisting of a National Militia, in which all serve. Does not the case of Switzerland offer us a splendid example of self-reliance, and one that we might profitably imitate in some degree in respect to the annual appropriations for our own Canadian Forces?

I might say that the figures given for the United States, do not include the expenditures for pensions for military service. To place their expenditures on the same footing for comparison, however, as other countries, the pension figures should be added, as in the expenditures given for Great Britain, Germany, France, and all the other Powers, the non-effective vote, or that devoted to half pay, pensions, &c., is included. With these added, the military expenditures of the U. S. should be \$2.35 per head of Population, and the percentage of federal taxation devoted to military services, 71%, the highest in the world. The expenditures by Japan have been very considerably increased since 1895.

An analysis of the figures in another way may not be uninteresting;—Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, maintain their armies by compulsory service. The average percentage of the gross federal taxation in these countries devoted to military service is about 30.9%.

Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden and Norway, maintain theirs by a combined system of compulsion and voluntary service. The average in these countries is 38.3%.

Great Britain and the United States alone support their armies by Voluntary Enlistment, and here the average of all Federal taxation devoted to the land forces is but 18.8%, or, if U. S. Pensions be added, 47.3%. The adding of the Pensions, however, in the case of the U. S. where the system has become abnormal, does not give a true indication of the expenditures upon national land defence, since, except in a sentimental way, (of some value of course,) the pension payments do not give any material strength to the U. S. defensive forces.

I would now invite you to consider a comparison of the military expenditures of our Sister Colonies of the Empire. For these figures I am indebted to General Hutton's able paper on "Our Comrades of Greater Britain," delivered before the Aldershot Military Society, 24th November 1896.

**Statement of the Military Expenditures and Proportion of Federal Taxation
devoted to Military and Defensive Purposes by the Great Self-
Governing Colonies of the British Empire, 1894.**

COLONY.	Population, 1894.	Organized Military Strength 1894.	Total Military Expenditure 1894.	Cost per head strength.	Cost per head of Pop.	Total Federal Taxation.	Percentage of taxation devoted to Military Purposes.
Cape Colony . .	1,711,487	7,978	£161,229 (\$783,572.94)	\$ 98.21	\$.44	\$ 5.27 (1892)	8.3 per cent.
Natal	560,000	790	£116,235 (\$565,677)	7.16	.98 (a)	3.68 (1891)	26 6 "
N. S. Wales . .	1,251,450	6,108	£272,358	(b)	1.04	10.80	
Victoria	1,199,103	5,388	199,722		.80	10.34	
Queensland . .	445,145	2,960	63,067		.68	15.19	
W. Australia . .	82,072	776	9,621		.52	28.16	
S. Australia . .	347,720	2,033	36,561		.65	10.74	
Tasmania . . .	157,456	1,458	12,424		.30	13.05	
Total Australia .	4,189,074	18,723	£593,753 \$2,889,598	(b) 154.33	.66 1/3	14.71	4.5 "
New Zealand . .	726,128	7,488	£86,365 \$420,310	(b)	.44	16.48	2.6 "
CANADA	5,021,476	35,288	\$1,309,920	37.12	.26	5.51	4.8 "

(a) Includes Frontier Police.

(b) The Expenditures of all the Australian Colonies and New Zealand include their contributions to the Australian Squadron.

(Quoted from "Our Comrades of Great Britain" by Colonel E. T. H. Hutton, C.B., A.D.C. to the Queen, 1896.)
N.B.—For a later and most comprehensive analysis of Military Expenditures of the various nations, see Journal of the Royal United Service Institution for January 1899, Vol. XLIII. No. 251, pp. 95—8.

Now, I have no doubt at all that many of my hearers will think the present rather a remarkable time to bring forward arguments in favour of Canada increasing her expenditures upon her national armament—that, to say nothing of the “Anglo-American entente,” the rescript of the Autocrat of all the Russias, the Master of the largest army upon mobilization in the world, makes the present appear most inopportune to urge the Dominion’s expansion of her means of self-defence. Both matters will, however, repay consideration, however brief. We have already seen that the co-called rescript on disarmament has resolved itself into a proposed agreement for a “limitation” of armaments and new inventions for war-like purposes, rather than actual “disarmament.” Russia herself, Germany, and France, are at this very moment transforming their artillery into quick-firing batteries and otherwise adding to the efficiency of their armies with frantic haste. The Sultan has practically ignored the invitation to disarm and is bankrupting his country to place his army as much in the front rank as possible by the possession of all the latest appliances. All seem to feel that if a limitation is to be put on armaments, each one must get as well prepared as they can before the limitation is enforced by unanimous agreement, supposing such will ever be obtained. This is why the friends of the Canadian Army would like to see forward steps taken now before we too may be prevented from adding to or increasing our forces, or their effectiveness by the provision of material &c., by an agreement on the part of Great Britain to maintain the Empire’s forces just as they may be at the time of such agreement as to limitation. The officers of the Militia cannot look with indifference upon such a prospect—we desire progression from our present state—we hope for the means to attain it—Canada at present has the cheapest defence force in the world, taking all things into consideration; and a substantial step forward might well be made, without being at all extravagant. Speaking as a Regimental officer, I believe I am quite right in saying that the great majority of our Militia get practically no pay—the Government allowance is all utilized to add in different ways to the greater efficiency of the corps—all serve purely for love and patriotism. In such a case, is it too much to ask that our Federal Government should generously add to its contributions to provide those requisites, some of which will be touched upon later on before I close, and others be alluded to, I confidently expect, by speakers in the discussion which I hope will follow, before International agreement shall perhaps have deprived us of the chance to improve our forces in any new directions, and compel us to remain exactly in the grooves we may then occupy.

In instance of the results following continued neglect of timely war-
 preparation by the Civil Government, I would like to invite your attention to the
 capture of the Spanish Fleet at Santiago last July. The Public know what happened,
 and may not know so well what were some of the principal reasons
 that combined to bring such occurrences about. The “London Times” of
 30th December 1898, contains a translation of some reports and letters of
 Admiral Cervera published in the “Epoca,” of Madrid, after that Officer’s
 return to Spain upon his liberation as a prisoner of war by the United States last

autumn, (1898). In the light of actual occurrences these reports are pathetic. Two years before the war with the U. S., Admiral Cervera shows that he pointed out to his Government, through the proper channels, that the Spanish fleet was in no condition for service, owing to the lack of actual necessities on board the ships, brought about by the *indifference of the superior authorities and the neglect of the Cortes or Parliament to vote the requisite funds*. When war was upon them the votes were hastily granted, but it was then too late, because modern war material cannot be manufactured in a day, and even if it could, the neutrality laws, after war is once declared, very much restrict its purchase. When ordered to sail to meet the enemy Admiral Cervera wrote that the conditions of his ships was even worse than at the earlier period first mentioned, while the U. S. fleet had been much augmented and strengthened. Some of his ships were without even the guns intended for their armament, and all were short in ammunition supply (30 rounds per gun on ships going to war whilst on ours even in peace time 300-500 are carried), and the crews had had practically no target practice whatever. Before sailing the Admiral was able to obtain neither coal, nor charts of the American seas, and only half the quantity of biscuit required for the sustenance of his crews. His last letter before the final catastrophe outside Santiago ends with "the final result is not doubtful—God be with us—Good bye."

Is this not a pathetic story of brave men compelled to make themselves the victims of deficiencies they sought in vain to have corrected?—but in the face of these figures for the military expenditure of our country—low even when contrasted with our neighbours of the U. S., even before they undertook expansion, can it be wondered that Canadian Officers are anxious to obviate a similar fate? No Minister, no Member of Parliament, no citizen of Canada, would like to think his National Militia would suffer from a like cause were it suddenly mobilized for actual service—but in truth can we assert there is very much dissimilarity?

On the other hand as an instance of the most thorough preparation and every day readiness for service to be found among the armies of the world to-day, I might quote for your information an English writer, one who is an authority on such matters, and who selects as his example the German Army Corps stationed upon the French frontier at Metz :—

"Between Metz and France is one long glaxis unassailable by the invader, and when you have walked through one street of the old French city you can see that you are in the entrenchment of an army on a war footing. Infantry, artillery, cavalry, and the rest are all equipped as if for instant active service; the stores are all to hand; harness and carts lie ready by the side of the transport animals. Not a gaiter button is wanting: In half an hour 30,000 men can be marching out of Metz with all the machinery and munitions of modern war with all the stores and equipment needed for a campaign."

Now I do not desire to convey the idea that we Canadians should set to work to bankrupt our national resources by slavishly imitating the full and complete readiness for war of the German armies along the Imperial frontiers—no Canadian Militiaman would hold up his hand for such a scheme—but I have shown as it were the two extremes—as to which should be our example in regard to the national defences, will, I think, require no prompting on my part. You will all readily see the wisdom of our recognizing the truth of the following trite extract from “Home’s *Precis of Modern Tactics*,” one of the many excellent reference books selected by Col. Kitson for our study at the Staff Course now going on at the Royal Military College, Kingston:—

He says:—

“When war is declared the time of preparation, (including
“National Votes for such preparation), and the time of training
“is past—the day of action has come. If the weapon is not well
“tempered, wants edge, and is useless—the responsibility rests
“with those who have allowed it to become so.”

I need not expatiate upon whom this responsibility rests—you will have recognized that it cannot be he soldier—in our case voluntarily doing his best with the means provided for him—the workman can only be blamed when it is shown the tools and material given him are such as to insure good workmanship, if used properly. Is there not an excellent example for our statesmen in the reply of Pitt, the Great Commoner, to King George the Third, when completing arrangements for that Expedition under Wolfe, the success of which transferred Canada to the British Crown. The King had shown marked opposition to some of the measures proposed by Wolfe, particularly in the appointment of certain of his Staff Officers. Pitt finally won the point for Wolfe by representing “that in order to render any General completely responsible for
“his conduct, he should be made, so far as possible, inexcusable if he should
“fail; and that consequently whatever an officer entrusted with a service of
“confidence requests, should be complied with.”

PART III.—THE FUTURE.

Having now briefly discussed the evolution of our Canadian Army from its first beginnings in the distant past up to the present, we are not unnaturally led to consider the question of its future, and the nature of that Force which we hope to see competent to deal with whatever problem or trials the hereafter may have in store for our Dominion.

A dispassionate consideration of the present condition of our citizen soldiery has shown us that upon the whole we are not at all in a fit state of preparation to undertake the most important of those great duties which devolve upon every country’s defensive forces. Having invited attention to the

existing state of things, it is quite proper that I should offer suggestions and remedies, believed to be for its improvement. It goes, I think, without saying, that Canadians upon the whole believe in high ideals—to obtain any good results we must aim high. Our standard should always be to provide, at least in such degree as we can do so, for the worst that may happen, and not be content to remain passive with what may have done well enough in peace time and the absence of any of those strains which war would assuredly place upon it.

A consideration of this question naturally brings again to one's mind the actual duties of our army. Granted that one of its main offices is to resist invasion and aggression from without, it is not to be supposed, from the numbers of the establishment, that its members alone are to face such armies as other countries might throw upon the borders of the Dominion in certain unfortunate and sincerely-to-be-regretted eventualities. As an integral portion of the British Empire, we believe, and in fact know, that in such case we should be backed up by the whole power and might of that Empire. Upon our citizen force, however, will assuredly rest the onus of meeting the first attacks, or of making the first *offensive* moves—and I for one certainly trust our Canadian forces will never be content to remain simply passive for, as proved by our historic past, an energetic "offensive-defensive" is our proper role—until that assistance we know we can count upon shall have had time to make itself felt. We must not, however, on this account, rely too much upon outside help—a vigorous self-help is not only what we should institute for our own sakes, but it is a duty we certainly owe to the rest of the great Empire of which we are so proud to form a part. Inasmuch as they would likely become involved primarily upon our account, it is plainly our duty to strive to be as thoroughly prepared as possible, so as to assist in the great task which we, in all probability, may have initiated, directly or indirectly. Readers of Napier's Peninsular War will readily recall of what little practical assistance for years were the Spanish and Portuguese troops during Wellington's campaign for the delivery of the Peninsula from the yoke of the foreign invader. To be the very reverse of what they were, will be, I am sure, the aim and ardent desire of every Canadian. To do so, as we would wish it, what is it we require? A Canadian National Force which in itself forms a real army—small though it may be, but fit and ready to take the field, if necessary, with at least the skeletons of all those different component parts which go to make up a modern fighting machine. I doubt very much indeed if many of our citizens, and particularly our public men, realize the tremendous responsibility and herculean task which they impose upon our Militia leaders in forcing them to remain as they now are, literally in the position of an undressed man liable to be suddenly thrust out in the midst of an arctic winter to battle with the elements in a condition fit only for the warmth and comfort of his own room—and such must be very much the position of our Force as a military body, as shown by comparison in the preceding chapter. It is little wonder, then, that those Officers of our Militia who have thought at all seriously upon the subject, tremble at the prospect of a

sudden active service call in the immediate present—and not so much for their own sakes, personally, as for the sufferings and disaster that could only be avoided by a miracle, in the event of an armed contest with any modern military body.

As means to attain this desired end, viz :—the further evolution of our Militia into a real National Army, while still retaining its present character as a citizen soldiery, I would beg to invite your attention to a few brief points which to me seem all important and deserving of first consideration. Time will not permit of anything like an enumeration and description of all the excellent suggestions which I am sure will occur to each and every one of you, whereby our Force in the future could be improved, so only the leading ones will be touched upon briefly :—

1.—THE ELIMINATION OF ALL POLITICAL CONTROL FROM THE PURELY MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY'S DEFENCES.

I am aware this is a very delicate subject for an officer, who is himself a very humble civil servant to touch upon ; but for any Militia officer to treat of the hoped for evolution of our Force, and pass by in silence that which in the past has militated so much against its best interests, would, I am sure, cause you to doubt his sincerity to advance the interests of that real army of which he has spoken to you so much. The army of any country should be above party—not above the civil authority of Government—but above any party into which its people are divided—it is the servant and the protector of the whole people and its interests should be too sacred to be subverted to that of Party. We are all too familiar with the Military history of the United States to need instances of the bareful results of political control in purely military matters.

2.—THE EDUCATION OF THE PUBLIC OF THE COUNTRY TO A MORE FAVOURABLE VIEW OF THEIR NATIONAL DEFENCES, AND THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC SPIRIT OF REAL INTEREST IN ALL THAT CONCERNS THE EFFICIENCY AND WELFARE OF THE MILITIA.

One of the greatest difficulties our Militia Force has always had to contend with is the antagonism of employers during the ordinary routine of peace. Were active service actually upon us little trouble would be experienced in this direction, but, as no modern force can become fitted for the field at the last moment, and as routine drills and exercises, in as strong force as the establishments provide, are necessary to prepare troops for service, the difficulty becomes an important one. Leading citizens with large stakes in the community should set the example of sacrifice for the good of all, and, no doubt, all of you can recall throughout the Dominion generous instances of this. At the same time, I am sure, cases of the reverse are not unknown to

you. Here in Ottawa we have had some very glaring examples, even some of our Government Departments have been slow to set that example to private employers naturally to be expected. But, while we can see no excuse in a Government Department discouraging service in its own ranks, when necessary for the preservation of order, we must admit there is really at times much to be said for the private employer of labour. An employer, say, has a number of men among his employees who are members of the Militia. They are wanted in the day time during working hours, either for an inspection, for class-firing, or 'for a few days' training in camp—the time perhaps is a particularly busy one in the employer's special business, and the absence of the men—some of them perhaps skilled workmen, whose places cannot be quickly filled, will be severely felt in delaying, may be, contract, or other work in connection with which time is an all hyphan important feature. Naturally the "leading citizen," who considers if he has a great stake in the community, that he pays correspondingly larger taxes for its protection, resents the further indirect taxation imposed upon him by the loss of his men's services; and so these are given notice, that next time, they must choose between Militia Service and his employment. The Militia pay in no way makes up for the loss of their two or three days work's pay, to say nothing of their permanent employment, so it is not hard to see what the men must choose, and hence the Force loses those men outright, or, they are constantly absent from any parades which in any way interfere with their daily labour, and these—class-firing and inspection—are the most important part of the whole Militia training. Now we generally take the sentimental view and blame these employers for lack of patriotism, and bewail the fact that everything now-a-days is on a dollar and cent basis. But why not acknowledge the fact—so far as it relates to most material things—and meet the trouble on a dollar and cent valuation, in addition to the education of the Public to an appreciation of their proper duty? The maintenance of a defensive force being borne by the whole community is it not a natural query:—Should not employers be re-couped in some way for the loss of the services of any military employees required for training or service during working hours?

2.—THE EXPANSION OF THE CADET SYSTEM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DRILL COMPANIES IN ALL PUBLIC AND SEPARATE SCHOOLS IN CITIES AND TOWNS.

This feature is at present progressing very favourably in some of our Provinces, particularly in Ontario, where the Local Legislature has voted a small grant for the furtherance of the project. The advantages of such a training are too obvious to need argument, as, in addition to the knowledge of military squad drill acquired, the boys are inoculated with a sense of order, a love of system, and initiated into habits of obedience to constituted authority and discipline, which cannot but be of benefit in every way. Counter attractions and interests of all kinds emphasise to us constantly that we require a nursery for our defensive forces during the ordinary routine times of peace. Danger will always bring forth plenty of men—but untrained, ignorant of drill,

and with very hazy notions of military discipline, so indispensable to the well-being of an army. Drill Companies in the Schools would largely obviate this. These Companies, while not being a source of expense to the Department, for they should not be permitted to detract at all from the Militia Votes proper—should, however, receive recognition and encouragement from the Military Authorities. They should take part with the Militia in all ceremonial reviews and parades wherever practicable, and Militia Officers should be detailed upon important National anniversaries, such as “Queenstown Heights,” “Lundy’s Lane,” &c., to attend certain large schools in rotation, in uniform, and address the boys upon the story of the day in question. Nothing is calculated to make our Citizen Army more a National one than an early inculcation of the stirring deeds of our forefathers amongst those from whom it must be recruited and maintained in the future.

3.—THE CREATION OF SUPPLY AND OTHER DEPARTMENTAL ADJUNCTS FOR OUR MILITIA FORCE, AND THEIR ORGANIZATION UPON LINES BEST CALCULATED TO MEET OUR OWN SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.

In all armies of the past, even in the best and most efficient, the Supply and Transport in the field have always been the weakest feature, while the folly of improvising at the last moment is shown by United States experience in Cuba last summer, and despatches tell us now the Supply Service in the Philippines has broken down. On the other hand Lord Kitchener’s campaign in the Soudan last August and September stands a monument of the advantages of a previously organized and well arranged service of Supply and Transport. One may say the cases are no example to us, and that Canada will never be called upon to undertake such distant and trying expeditions; true, but, if her Militia Force is ever to be taken seriously and fitted for the work which may devolve upon it, it is just as essential that the young fellows who voluntarily come forward to serve shall be provided beforehand with some organization, nucleus, or framework of military machinery for their transport, feeding, and supply, as it was to arm them with the magazine rifle and 12 pounderguns a couple of years ago. Transport and Supply may be roughly divided into two kinds, Regimental, and Departmental or General. No military unit, however smart at its drill, or skilful at the targets, can be considered efficient for the field, either in offence or defence, unless provided with some practical means of carrying its reserve ammunition, its tools for entrenching, its medical comforts for first aid, to say nothing of its rations, tents and blankets. All these should be conveyed by a regimental transport—particularly the first three—ammunition, tools and medicines—inseparable from the regiment, a part of it, and always under the C. O.’s charge and control. Departmental or General Supply and Transport, on the other hand, deals with the larger matters of supply of all kinds, rations &c., and it is the medium whereby the Regimental Supply is replenished as required. At present we have neither system—and one frequently hears ours countrymen remark.—“Oh! what do we want

such accessories for? We could improvise waggon trains in no time—look at the North West in 1885.” We should remember, I think, that we have no Hudson Bay Co. now in Eastern Canada, and, if ever required, very little time indeed will be given us in which to improvise; that while the style of country vehicles we would be obliged to utilize would do well enough for general service trains, they are not well adapted for closely and handily following a regiment with ammunition, &c. In my humble opinion we should endeavour to equip ourselves with a regimental transport, for at least the city Corps, as those most liable to the first call, if required—2 or 3 carts per regiment would not be an excessive demand—these should be procured with harness, &c., horses could be obtained when actually required.

Speaking of Regimental Transport in that compendium of useful knowledge “The Soldiers Pocket Book,” Lord Wolseley says:—

“During all our recent wars, we have had regimental transport
“and it has always proved the most to be relied on.”

Official History of Egypt'n Campaign 1882, by Col. Maurice, R. A.

Extract Memo: Sir G. J. Wolseley, in re: preparation Egypt'n Expedition, 1882.

“With a view of rendering mobile the two divisions of infantry,
“and brigade of cavalry which it is contemplated we may have to
“send to Ismailia, it is essential that each regiment of cavalry,
“battalion of infantry, battery of artillery, and company of en-
“gineers should embark complete with their regimental trans-
“ports.”

An ambulance detachment should naturally be an adjunct of every one of our Corps, and it is gratifying to see the regiments throughout Canada provided with such steadily increasing, also that steps are reported to have been taken for the formation of an Army Medical Department from our present regimental service.

3a.—THE EDUCATION OF A CORPS OF OFFICERS FROM WHOM A TRAINED STAFF MAY BE SELECTED IN CASE OF MOBILIZATION, OR THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL CONTINGENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE “OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE,” SHOULD SUCH CONTINGENCIES ARISE.

It is useless to take measures for the provision of the “hands and feet” of our army, without at the same time making provision for the brains to guide and direct their efforts. The need of a general staff when once an army is mobilized, or even about to be mobilized is, I believe, conclusive to all in this room—the demonstration of its need was too plain in the case of the United States last spring. However, it may not be inopportune at this juncture to quote

from Lieut. John Parker, 13th U. S. Infantry, in his instructive article, written after the war, on "Our Army Supply Departments and the Need of a General Staff," which appeared in the "Review of Reviews for December 1898. Speaking of the formation of a General Staff for the U. S. Army, Lieut. Parker thus describes its functions:—

"To this body belongs the problems of organization, strategy, logistics, the larger problems of supply, and the acquisition of classified information previous to the outbreak of war. It forms plans for all emergencies in advance, supervises their execution at the critical moment, acts as the eyes, ears, and hands of the commander. As the will of the commander is the electro-motive force of an Army, so is the General Staff its nervous system. It is the channel through which the Commander harmoniously energizes the whole military machine. It is the thinking and planing part of the army. A Commander has enough to do to meet unexpected emergencies and to execute on time without fail the operations entrusted to him. The General Staff relieves him of the burden of a mass of detail work and leaves his mind free to attack larger problems.

He thus concludes:—"The formation of this body would ensure intelligent operations and well laid plans and perfect combinations of effort in the future against any possible enemy. It would soon become possible for the President to repeat the famous action of Von Moltke at the outbreak of the war with France. The great Commander being aroused from sleep by a courier in the middle of the night with news of the declaration of war, simply turned in bed, remarking, "pigeon-hole No. 4!"

While our aspirations in Canada are very modest indeed compared with this, I think we must all feel deeply grateful to our present Commander, Major-General Hutton, and the Government which gave force to his suggestion, for the inauguration of the course now in progress at the Royal Military College, Kingston, for the instruction of our officers in the duties of the General Staff. As, however, this is entirely a new thing in Canada and unfamiliar to the majority of our Militia Officers, it may not be inopportune to elaborate in even greater detail than given by Lieut. Parker of the United States Army, as to what are the duties of this General Staff. The old idea of a Staff Officer was that it was quite sufficient he should have good eyes and be a bold rider. To-day, thanks to the untiring system and methodical plodding of the Germans, we require very much more indeed than those qualities, excellent though they be. General von Schellendorf, Chief of the General Staff of the Guard Corps of the German Army, and one of the most eminent authorities on Staff work in the world to-day, thus sums up their duties;

In peace time the General Staff work out all details belonging to mobili-

zation, marching, stationing, manœuvres, and all military matters connected with railways and telegraphs. They should study all possible theatres of war—the preparation of maps, and the elaboration of plans, &c., for possible movements based upon a careful study of past experiences in similar emergencies; also the instruction of younger officers in Staff duties.

In war time their duties become of greater importance. They are thus laid down by General von Schellendorf:—

1. Working out all arrangements for the quartering, security, marching and fighting of troops, according to the varying conditions of the military situation.
2. Communicating the necessary orders, either verbally or in writing, at the right time and in sufficient detail.
3. Obtaining, collecting and working out in order all materials which concern the natural and the military features of the theatre of war and the procuring of maps.
4. Collecting and estimating the value of information received concerning the enemy's forces and reporting on the same to the higher military authorities.
5. Keeping up the fighting condition of the troops and being constantly informed of their condition in every respect.
6. Charge of day books—publishing reports of engagements and the collection of important materials to afterwards form a history of the war.
7. Special duties, viz :—reconnaissances.

Now you may have possibly gathered from all this that this General Staff becomes a lot of “knows-alls” with perhaps “swelled heads,” and form a sort of Corps of Officers of somewhat different make-up to the other officers of the National Force, but this is quite an error—in all the larger European Armies experience has taught that officers selected and trained in the duties of the General Staff are kept at their best by frequent returns to regimental duty and periods of training with the different arms. There is no desire to place themselves on a superior plane to their regimental comrades, but rather to ensure throughout the whole army of the country that systematical co-operation which alone can give success to any military effort. It is to this end that the initial training of a party of our Officers is now proceeding under Col. Kitson at the Royal Military College, Kingston.

The best modern instance of the value of a trained Staff is of course the Franco-German War of 1870–71. There, as you all know, the Germans with an efficient Staff, trained under the great Von Moltke, had practically everything their own way in the conflict, while the French who had not paid anything like the same attention to their Etat-Major in the preparatory days of peace, were simply not in it from the beginning.

A later case is that of the Italian Army operating in Abyssinia, so badly cut up by semi-savages at Adowa, although the Europeans were armed and

equipped with all the latest appliances of modern warfare.—Experts who have studied the causes of the disaster agree that the lack of trained and competent leaders was the main reason for the Italian defeat and the needless waste of valuable lives.

4.—THE INAUGURATION OF MANOEUVRES, OR SOMETHING PRACTICAL ON A MORE EXTENDED SCALE THAN IS PROVIDED BY OUR PRESENT CAMPS OF EXERCISE AND HOLIDAY REVIEWS, WITH, AT THE SAME TIME, THE EXACTION OF A MORE RIGOROUS DISCIPLINE WHILE UNDER ARMS FROM ALL RANKS.

To expect that our senior officers, C. O's., and Field Officers, should be competent to handle their respective units in the field to the best advantage, is, under our present system of training, exactly like expecting a young man to box well who is never allowed to spar. Unless he is a perfect genius in the exhibition of the manly art he will fail ignominiously. Our present camps are too small and the opportunities afforded Field Officers of gaining any practical knowledge in the relative uses and interdependence of the three arms are too restricted and rare. Even granting that the same repetition of preliminary training must follow year after year, and that the time is very short, still, if, for instance, all the forces of Ontario, say, were assembled together, the last two days at any rate could be employed in a manner to enable our leaders to learn more in one camp that way than they would in a dozen such as they have been used to in the past.

Upon the matter of discipline, I refer, of course, to when under arms, on parade. A feature of our Militia, always remarked upon by soldier visitors is the amount of talking indulged in by the men in the ranks and the excessive shouting and admonishing by the officers. We know, of course, that these are the failings of all non-regular troops, but we should specially try to overcome them, as we should always endeavour to agument our other shortcomings as a military force by the highest possible standard of efficiency.

We all know the reputation of the British Regular for his adherence to discipline and his proverbial steadiness. I do not know that it ever was better illustrated than in the French work "*L'Armée Française en 1867*" by the late General Trochu, from which I would like to read you the following quotation :—

"A highly interesting communication was made to "General Trochu by Marshal Bugeaud, based on the latter's Peninsula experiences. In it he gives a vivid description of the contrasted bearing of British and French troops in the field. Arriving withing 1,000 yards of the English line the French soldiers quickly exchanged remarks and hastened their march, so that their ranks soon began to waver. The English meanwhil

In
we see
our mod
sure, ap

At
of about
limited
take first
than it
mind an
at hand,
to secure
peace, to
that in s
for comm
difficulty
done so.
Britain
parliame
ishment
wealthy
moreover
give an c
ent, co

“stood silent, with grounded arms, presenting in their unshaken
 “immobility the imposing aspect of a long red wall. Soon the
 “distance became less, and repeated shouts burst forth of “Vive
 “l'Empereur”! En avant! A la Baionette”! Shakoos were
 “raised on the muzzles of muskets; the march became a run;
 “the ranks got mixed; the agitation degenerated into tumult.
 “The English line, however, impassive and silent as fate, stood
 “firm with grounded arms until we came within 300 yards of the
 “storm about to burst upon us. At this fateful moment the solid
 “wall moved. “An indescribable foreboding nailed many of our
 “advancing soldiers to the ground as they fired feebly in the direc-
 “tion of the enemy. Then came a volley, concentrated, harm-
 “onious, and accurate, which swept our ranks with pitiless cruelty,
 “Decimated, and crushed, we fell back, seeking to regain our
 “equilibrium. At length three formidable cheers burst from
 “our inexorable foes. At the third they were on us with the
 “bayonet pressing our disorderly retreat.”

In the silence under arms, the steadiness, the cool waiting for the word, we see our model—no less necessary now, even perhaps more needed with our modern arms than formerly. My brother Officers present will all, I am sure, appreciate its necessity.

THE QUESTION OF OFFICERS.

At present our National Force is several hundred short in its establishment of about 3,000 Officers. Now of all ranks which should be up to the very limited establishment of a force like our own, the Officers should certainly take first place. It is always easier in emergencies to get men to be instructed than it is to obtain trained and competent Instructors. Bearing this in mind and the great necessity of having leaders for our National Force always at hand, does it not seem that our present system is not sufficiently attractive to secure and retain the full number of Officers we require during the routine of peace, to fit our “army” to perform its functions successfully in war. It is true that in some Corps in favoured localities a waiting list of eligible candidates for commissions is kept on fyle, but the great majority of our Corps find much difficulty in filling up the gaps in the commissioned ranks, and have always done so. This is, however, by no means peculiar to Canada. In Great Britain the Home defensive forces were stated, upon the authority of a parliamentary paper of last year, to be nearly 2,000 officers below the establishment on 1st January 1898, notwithstanding the greater proportion of wealthy citizens and the possession of a leisure class which we have not. And moreover, this was notwithstanding that the Imperial Government actually give an outfit allowance of £20, to every Officer of Volunteers upon appointment, contingent, of course, upon his passing certain examinations. In Canada

we have no such allowance and yet keep up the expensive uniform and equipment of the Imperial Officer. Comments are sometimes made upon the lack of practical patriotism of our young men of the better class and particularly upon ex-R. M. C. graduates remaining in the country, whom it is not unnaturally expected should be willing to give the Militia the benefit of their service in return for that portion of the cost of their education and training borne by the State; but, is it not out of the question for most young graduates having to start life at the bottom of the ladder, to spend money upon a costly uniform, and the Canadian paterfamilis generally thinks he has done enough for his boy in sending him through the College without starting him afresh in the Militia afterwards. One means of securing services of Cadets in the Militia might be to provide the last year men with a Lieut's Tunic, &c. An out-fit allowance would seem specially applicable to our case. I cannot, however, help thinking that could we evolve greater national individuality in the dress and equipment of our Dominion Militia, instead of always copying the Imperial Forces (except of course professionally), we would in the long run gain materially, and assist in making our army a truly national one. We might not look so gorgeous at a *levée* or reception, but I am confident we would have less vacant commissions and more of the many excellent young men whose services we now lose altogether. You all will recall how apparent was this lack of individuality in appearance on the part of the Canadian Contingent at the Jubilee of 1897. Again, there is practically very little reward for the zealous and painstaking regimental Officers, N. C. Os. & Men of the Active Militia. Except the approval of their own consciences and the encouraging commendation of their C. Os. there is nothing for them, even after long years of service and self-sacrifice. I have not forgotten the rumoured long service medal—but I fear something more tangible is needed to make ours in every sense a thoroughly national army. For example, why should not Militiamen of approved service be accorded whenever travelling upon Government Railways or Railways heavily bonused originally by our country and endowed with the public lands, like the C. P. R., some reduction in rates—however small. When a few serve for the benefit of all, and do so voluntarily, it does not seem unfair that these few should enjoy some special benefits. Some privilege of this kind would not only be the finest recruiting card possible, both for Officers and Men, but would also elevate the Force in the eyes of all by such a practical appreciation of its services.

One might very easily dilate upon the great advantages and necessities of the annual training of all our units; of the preparation and working out of all details for a mobilization; of the paramount importance of practical and serviceable organization; of the value of making ourselves independent in the matter of manufacturing ammunition; of the provision of maps for the training of our senior officers in a more perfect knowledge of their own country; of the great need of some arrangement for the provision of foot gear to our Infantry; of the absolute necessity for rifle ranges and the possibilities of Morris Tube practice ranges for the new rifle, of the building up of a reserve supply of

clothing and material, and the expansion of our Engineer Branch; each and all of these, and I have no doubt many more, will occur to you as being necessary before we have evolved an "army" in the sense in which the citizen soldiery of Canada unanimously regard it. Time, however, will not permit of a more extended reference—each subject alone would require a separate lecture to do it justice. I must therefore pass on, confident your indulgence, and the expectation of hearing some remarks upon these points from some of the distinguished gentlemen who have honoured us with their presence this evening, will excuse your lecturer.

CONCLUSION.

In preceding pages I have referred to the lack of recognition on the part of the country generally for the military services of her sons, and I believe a fault finder should always quote instances. Is not, however, this evidenced by the treatment accorded the Officers of the N.W.F. Force in 1885, amongst whom not a single decoration, not a single brevet, nor promotion of any kind, outside of the G.O.C., was distributed—an occurrence rare indeed in the annals of British campaigns. Then again the denial of the privileges of the pension system to our Permanent Officers, giving their whole time and career to Canada, and standing ready constantly to take their lives in their hands at all times and places; whilst at the same time those privileges have been enjoyed by every permanent clerk in the country's civil service, under no obligation of such character whatsoever. These things strike a Militiaman as remarkable anomalies—more particularly, perhaps, the latter one, as even the "Patrons of Industry," that ultra-economical party of our country, conceded in their platform that pensions should be given for military services. These facts are not calculated to inspire enthusiasm, and must retard and check much effort on the part of younger officers willing to exert themselves to the utmost for the betterment of our Forces; but with such examples before them what can be expected? When looking around they see the most able and energetic of those who may be termed their native leaders—Officers like Colonel Otter, the late Col. Van Straubenzee, General Strange, Colonel Maunsell, and many others of long and meritorious services, some in responsible commands both during peace and in the field, to say nothing of N. C. O's and men serving long terms in the Permanent Corps—as yet denied the provisions for honourable retirement, which is everywhere the soldiers' reward? I hold no brief here for anyone, nor has anybody prompted me to these statements, but it does seem to me that if a different course were taken with leaders looked up to and respected for their military worth by the whole National Force, the results in the long run could not be but most beneficial to our whole Militia. It is, however, in no despondent or carping spirit that I have touched upon these points—we are a young country—our people have been and are so much engaged with the best portion of their energies and means in reclaiming and

developing their great heritage from sea to sea, that they have not perhaps devoted at all times that attention to the tithe for self-defence and protection which no people in any country can neglect long with impunity. It is mainly your task, gentlemen of the Association of the Militia Officers of Canada, to remedy this state of affairs—to endeavour to educate the public mind to the correct conception of its duties in regard to its voluntary citizen army—to bring to bear your influences in your various localities throughout the country for a larger share of consideration towards the Force on the part of Public Men generally, and employers of labour particularly—to show by your continued self-denial and energy in promoting the welfare of your several corps that you are worthy and deserving of such expected consideration, and in everything strive as the military salt of Canada to retain that military flavour in its highest and most pungent state—for is it not truly said:—"If the salt hath lost its flavour wherewith shall the earth be salted?" To quote from one of the most distinguished and popular of our Governor Generals, Lord Dufferin, in one of his celebrated speeches in the House of Lords and to turn it to account for our purposes:—

"*Omnia fui nihil expedit*" (I have been everything, nothing has availed,) sighed one of the greatest of Roman Emperors as he lay upon his deathbed at York; yet, when a moment afterwards, the Captain of his guard came to him for the watchword of the night, with his dying breath he gave it, "Laboremus" (Let us work on.)

So it is my comrades with us, so it was with our predecessors—they laboured to lay the foundations of a defensive force in Canada, we build on and improve, others again will raise the superstructure and fit together perhaps those various component parts which alone go to make a real army—meanwhile, one by one the faithful workmen, their spell of toil accomplished, descend, it may be, into oblivion, but all the time better, stronger, more efficient, rises the fabric of our national defences; with the broader and more beautiful spread on every side of the sacred realms of civilization, hand must go the adequate preparations and provision of modern equipment for the retention against all comers in our own independence of that glorious heritage left us by those who have gone before. So let our watchword be, as it was for Constantius and Constantine, "Laboremus," "Laboremus,"—(Let us work on)—always moving forward with the times, and like the prudent business man increasing our national insurances, by improvements in our citizen soldiery, as our country increases in material wealth and prosperity. In this way alone can be accomplished "the evolution of the Canadian Army."

At the conclusion of the lecture His Excellency the Earl of Minto addressed the meeting.

THE SPEECH OF H. E. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

His Excellency the Earl of Minto said he had heard many military lectures, but never one that went straighter to the point than Capt. Winter's had been. In connection with the creation of an army the organization of a staff was the first thing to be done. With such an organization, in case of emergency the difficulty of mobilization would be much lessened. The recent Hispano-American War was a most valuable lesson in this respect, and in the matter of transportation and supplies. He pointed out how in the North West rebellion of 85 the success of the campaign had been largely due to the fact that the Hudson's Bay Company had been able to supply at short notice an excellently organized transport and supply department. At no time did he think there were more than 700 half breeds in arms against General Middleton, and the numbers opposed to General Strange and Colonel Otter were probably less, but the strength of the Canadian Militia in the field and on the line of communications was very large. Speaking entirely from recollection it probably exceeded 7,000 men. This force was totally unsupplied as to transport or any of the departments necessary for a force in the field. The Hudson's Bay Company to a large extent supplied their wants, but the case was a peculiar one, and it would be worse than misleading to accept it for future guidance. His Excellency deplored the apathy shown by the ordinary citizen in regard to the welfare of the militia. Employers of labor should understand that the force was practically an insurance for them, and should give the militia a patriotic support. His Excellency also expressed the hope that the lecture might be printed and distributed; the lecturer had gone to the root of the trouble in attacking the question of funds, and was perfectly right in laying much stress upon the importance and necessity for some kind of administrative developments for the militia—all these things cost money—particularly at first, but if not done beforehand it was quite impossible to do so in a time of stress and danger, or, if possible, only at a very increased expense and sacrifice. He hoped, as time went on, they would appreciate the force better. General Hutton had started out on the right lines, and he thought they were lines which the country would appreciate. He trusted the result would be a perfect army machine. (Cheers.)

Col. Foster, Quartermaster-General, congratulated the lecturer on the able way in which the importance of organization to an army had been presented, and said he could add nothing to what had been said so clearly and emphatically. He would however like to tell the audience that the efforts of Canada to organize her forces were attracting attention across the frontier, as well as in England. Col. Foster had lately been in New York, and had met the Governor of that State, Col. Roosevelt, who told him that the efforts of Canada to create a national militia army were being watched with great interest. He pointed out the advantage Canada had in having one central government for military purposes, in place of each Province having its own, as each State had in the United States. The militia in England under local

control were in an inefficient state until they came under central-control of the War Office. Each State in the United States had its own organization, and was armed, equipped, drilled and trained according to the ideas of each State. The result was that on mobilization chaos reigned supreme, as the units of the different States were not able to be utilized alongside each other to advantage.

The United States were trying now under some difficulty to remedy the state of things, and to place themselves in the position in which fortunately Canada was, of possessing a national militia, under central authority.

MAJOR GENERAL HUTTON.

Major-General Hutton spoke as follows :

"Your Excellency and Gentlemen,—I am sure that I shall be expressing the wishes of the audience when I convey to Capt. Winter the warmest congratulations upon the very interesting and able lecture which we have just heard. Capt. Winter, in the first part of his paper, has made it clear in the happiest possible manner that the conditions which brought the militia of Canada into being have now ceased to exist. He has told us, and with reason, that the militia of Canada was originally formed as a supplement to the regular army of Great Britain then garrisoning Canada. Upon the withdrawal of the regular British troops, in the sixties, the whole condition of the military defences of Canada underwent the same constitutional change that befel the political situation. With the birth of the Dominion followed the creation of a Canadian nation, but no corresponding change took place in the development of her defence forces. Capt. Winter makes this point very clear—you will forgive me if I say that in Part III. of my Annual Report, which most of you have probably read, you will find that the requirements of a Canadian army such as the Canadian nation should possess are clearly indicated.

"The lecturer has alluded to the Swiss military system. It was my privilege to be sent by the Imperial Government to report upon the Swiss army, in 1887, and I had then the great advantage of studying on the spot its system, its organization, and its result. We shall do well here in Canada if we apply the principles underlying the organization and maintenance of this Swiss national army. The independence of Switzerland is guaranteed by the great powers of Europe, yet Switzerland is content to tax herself to the extent of \$1.55 per head of population for the maintenance of an organized national defensive force, which, amounts to a complete army of 147,000 active Militia and 83,000 landwehr or reserve.

"Belgium, similarly, whose independence has been guaranteed by Great Britain, also taxes herself to a similar extent and maintains an army for her defence of 163,000 men. The independence of Canada may be understood to be similarly guaranteed by the Mother Country. But what have the Canadian

people done for their own defence? Capt. Winter tells us we tax ourselves to the extent of 32c. per head. Surely the time has arrived for the Canadian people to realize that as a portion of the British Empire it is their duty to provide themselves with an adequate defence, and not shrink from the responsibility which rests upon them as a nation, and decline to bear the cost which will be entailed, even if it amounts to twice the existing amount of taxation per head. The useful *resumé* of facts put into our hand by the lecturer is, to a great extent, based upon a similar schedule which appears as a portion of a paper read by me in England in October 1896, upon my return from Australia. It is a point worthy of your notice that the colonies of Australia, though distant 14,000 miles from Great Britain, and unaffected by questions of old world policy, pay just twice the amount per head for their defence that the people of Canada are paying, who have a frontier of 3,260 miles contiguous to a foreign power.


"I hope that the Council of the Officers' Association may see their way to print and circulate the very interesting paper which Capt. Winter has contributed. His suggested recommendations, as regards the requirements of the Canadian army of the future, are eminently sound. Many of you are aware that the various points suggested by him have been very carefully dealt with in the Annual Report, which I have submitted to the Government. I should like to add, moreover, that the Minister of Militia, to whom I am responsible, has it in contemplation to act upon many of the recommendations made. I may even go so far as to say that the estimates submitted by me have, for the most part, received his favorable consideration. A brighter future, therefore, appears to be in store for us soldiers who are serving the Canadian people, and I am warranted in saying, on behalf of my comrades, that we intend, one and all, to do our utmost to give to Canada a sound and complete Canadian army, which shall, in some degree, at least in organization, discipline and efficiency, prove itself worthy of the Canadian nation, and of the responsibilities which, upon a national emergency, would rest upon our shoulders.

"I shall, I feel, be acting on behalf of the whole audience if I tender, with His Excellency's permission, the heartiest vote of thanks to Capt. Winter for his lecture, and the appreciation of the Officers' Association for the honor which has been done its members by the presence here to-night of His Excellency the Governor-General of Canada and our Commander-in-Chief." (App)

CAPTAIN WINTER'S REPLY.

Capt. Winter. In expressing his appreciation of the vote of thanks, regretted his inability to do justice to a subject of such prime importance to Canada and so far reaching to the whole Empire as the "Evolution" of our National Force. He felt it a very great honor to be invited to address the Officers' Association upon such a theme, and to be accorded the consideration

testified by the presence of His Excellency and the General Officer commanding, as well as so many of his brother officers and friends. The subject of evolution was the one upon which no doubt we would in the main all agree, but upon many of details touched upon to-night he could scarce hope to find all in full accord—however all Canadians were working for but one end, viz :—the improvement of our Militia Force and the promotion of its efficiency along modern and progressive lines. He earnestly hoped our Public Men would look seriously at the figures in the leaflet of statistics, distributed during the lecture—for if they would, he felt sure a realization of the necessity for more adequate appropriations could not but be the result. As a junior officer he begged the indulgence of his seniors present for his treatment of the subject—he had spoken as a young Canadian, purely for Canada and her defensive forces, and actuated, not by a spirit of faultfinding, but by an ardent desire to see her improve and her forces made more efficient and effective.



l Officer comman
s. The subject
main all agree, b
hope to find all
ne end, viz :— t
s efficiency alon
Public Men wou
ibuted during th
necessity for mo
t junior officer h
t of the subject—
nd her defensiv
ardent desire t
ive.